

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINS, PINT, VS

SUBJECT: NATIONAL POLICE BRIEFING ON ARREST OF COMMUNIST
AGENTS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LICENSES OF FIVE
SAIGON DAILIES

REFS : A) SAIGON 1465 B) SAIGON 1466

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIEFING WHICH WAS PRESENTED AT THE SPECIAL INTERMINISTERIAL PRESS CONFERENCE ON THIS SUBJECT ON FEBRUARY 6. BRIEFING OPENED WITH DESCRIPTION OF CAPTURED COMMUNIST DOCUMENTS WHICH GVN OFFERED AS PROOF OF INTENSIVE AND SYSTEMATIC EFFORT MADE BY COMMUNISTS TO INFILTRATE THE PRESS IN SAIGON AND INCLUDED FIRST PERSON TESTIMONY OF TWO RALIER-S WHO WERE PERSONALLY ENGAGED IN COMMUNIST PROSELYTIZING EFFORT AIMED AT PRESS IN SAIGON/GIA DINH AREA. ALTHOUGH LONG, WE ARE TRANSMITTING FULL TEXT IN VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF SUBJECT AND FACT IT NOT ADEQUATELY COVERED IN PRESS REPORTS WE HAVE SEEN.

2. BEGIN TEXT: THE NATIONAL POLICE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE STRATEGY THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE USING TO MANIPULATE THE PRESS. IN 1960 THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LAO DONG PARTY (COMMUNIST PARTY) PASSED RESOLUTION #3. THROUGH THIS RESOLUTION THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DETERMINED THAT THEY WOULD ADOPT THE STRATEGY OF "USING THE COUNTRYSIDE UNCLASSIFIED

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TO ENCIRCLE THE CITIES" IN ORDER TO INVADE SOUTH VIETNAM BYSFORCE OF

ARMS. IN THE LATTER PART OF 1974 RVNAF CAPTURED A COSVN DOCUMENT IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE THAT INDICATED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE CHANGING THEIR STRATEGY. TURNING FROM THEIR EARLIER STRATEGY OF "USING THE COUNTRYSIDE TO ENCIRCLE THAT CITIES" THEY DECIDED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO COQUER THE CITIES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COUNTRYSIDE HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN. THE COMMUNIST DOCUMENT CALLED FOR THE CONQUEST OF THE CITIES AND UPHELD THE ROLE OF PROSELYTIZING AMONG THE MILITARY AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA AS A BASIC PART OF ITS STRATEGY.

3. ACCORDING TO THIS DOCUMENT, MILITARY AND INTELEWECTURAL PROSELYTIZING WILL PLAY A KEYSROLE IN DECIDING THE SUCCESS THROUGH A COUP D'ETAT WHICH WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED MORE THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS THAN MILITARY AND WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE CITIES AND THE PROVINCES. PROSELYTIZING AMONG THE MILITARY AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA WILL CREATE A POLITICAL CRISIS BY CAUSING CONFUSION WITHIN THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF THE RVN, THE PRICIPAL AIM OF WHICH WOULD BE TO UNDERMINE THE MORALE OF THE COMBATANTS.

4. ANOTHER DOCUMENT, RECENTLY CAPTURED BY THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN VINH BINH PROVINCE ON DECEMBER 11, 1974, ALSO TOUCHED ON THE QUESTION OF CONTROL OF THE PRESS. MORE SPECIFICALLY IN COMMUNIST TERMS, THE PRESS PROSELYTIZING PLAN (WHICH WAS PART OF THE PLAN FOR PROSELYTIZING THE MILITARY AND THE INTLLIGENTSIA) AIMED AT SUPPORTING THE STRATEGY OF DEFINITELY CAPTURING THE CITIES IN THE PRESENT PHASE.

5. THROGUH THESE DOCUMENTS WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE COMMUNIST HAVE ESTABLISHED TWOPRESSING NEEDS THAT MUST BE MET: TO INFILTRATE CADRES INTO A NUMBER OF DAILIES IN THE CAPITAL CITY IN ORDER TO CONTROL THOSE DAILIES AND TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH A NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS IN ORDER TO TURN THEM INTO HARD-CORE ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD THEN PLAY LEADING ROLES IN THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENTS IN THE CAPITAL CITY. PROCEDURALLY, THE PLAN CALLED FOR SETTING UP AN ORGANIZATION AND THEN EXERTING EVERY EFFORT TO WIN SYMPATHY WHILE INFILTRATING FROM THE HIGHEST TO THE LOWEST LEVEL WITH A VIEW TOWARD CONTROLLING THE EDITORIAL STAFF SO THAT IT WOULD PUBLISH MATERIAL DESIGNED TO CREATE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE NATIONAL RANKS. IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE DOCUMENT SEIZED IN VINH BINH PROVINCE, THE MASSES WERE ENCOURAGED TO STRUGGLE FOR THE

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RIGHT TO LIFE AND DEMOCRACY, FOR THE RELEASE OF CIVILIAN PRISONERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS' LINE AND FOR AN END TO US AID. THE DOCUMENT ALSO CALLED FOR DENOUSCING THE RVN FOR HAVING VIOLATED THE PARIS AGREEMENT, DEMANDING THE OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMUNIST LINE.

6. COMMUNIST CADRES WHO WERE INFILTRATED INTO THE PRSS CIRCLES

OF THE CAPITAL CITY OR THOSE WHO HAD BEEN OPERATING HERE WERE OBLIGED TO BRING GROUPS OF PEOPLE TOGETHER FOR THE PURPOSES OF READING AND DISCUSSING PRESS ITEMS WHICH WOULD BE INTERPRETED FAVORABLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMUNIST LINE. WE KNOW THAT THOSE WHO HAVE READ PRESS ITEMS TO THE PUBLIC FALL WITH THIS STYLE OF OPERATION.

7. THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE OTHER CAPTURED DOCUMENT CLEARLY SHOW THE IMPORTANCE THE COMMUNISTS ATTACH TO CONTROLLING THE PRESS IN THE JVN AS PART OF THEIR SCHEME TO TAKE OVER THE CAPITAL CITY. THUS, IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE COMMUNISTS, OR IN OTHER WORDS THE LAO DONG PARTY OF NORTH VIETNAM, ARE PLAYING THE LEAD ROLE IN COSVN THOUGH THE LATTER'S PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING COMMITTEES.

8. THE CENTRAL PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING BRANCH IN SOUTH VIETNAM GIVES DIRECT GUIDANCE TO THE SAIGON/GIA DINH SECTOR WHICH IS ORGANIZED INTO MANY SUBCOMMITTEES. THE PRESS SUBCOMMITTEE CONSISTS OF TWO SECTIONS DEVOTED TO RESEARCH AND WRITING, RESPECTIVELY. THE RESEARCH SECTION FOLLOWS THE RVN PRSS IN ORDER TO DEVISE PLANS TO MANIPULATE IT WHILE THE WRITING SECTION WRITES AND DISSEMINATES DOCUMENTS AIMED AT DIRECTING THE PRSS TOWARD THE COMMUNIST LINE. THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE TWO SECTIONS ARE SUPERVISED BY THE SAIGON/GIA DINH SECTOR AND THEIR OUTPUT IS COORDINATED WITH THE FIFTH COLUMN ORGAN WHICH IS CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PLACING CARDERS AMONG THE RANKS OF THE RVN NEWSMEN. THIS ORGAN ALSO HAS ANOTHER FUNCTION WHICH IS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT AND PROSELYTIZE NEWSMEN.

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9. THROUGH CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND DEPOSITIONS MADE BY PRISONERS, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE RESEARCH AND WRITING SECTIONS OF THE PRESS SUBCOMMITTEE AND PROPAGANDA TRAINING FOR THE SAIGON/GIA DINH AREA IS HEADED BY THAM NHO WHILE THE ORGAN IN CHARGE OF INFILTRATING CADRES INTO THE VN PRESS CIRCLE IN SAIGON IS HEADED BY TO HOAI.

10. OUR EXHIBIT INCLUDES DOCUMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY WHICH WERE GATHERED BY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND COLLECTED BY ARMY UNITS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THESE DOCUMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS ORIGINATED IN THE LAO DONG PARTY OF NORTH VIETNAM AND WERE DISTRIBUTED THROUGH COSVN TO ITS VARIOUS PROPAGANDA SECTIONS.

11. IN INTRODUCING LIVING PROOF OF THE COMMUNIST PLANS, THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMANDER MENTIONED THE CASE OF TO MINH TRUNG WHO WAS BORN IN 1933 IN SOC TRANG (MEKONG DELTA, SOUTH VIETNAM). A DOCTOR OF HISTORY, TRUNG PARTICIPATED IN THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST THE FRENCH AND IN 1954 REGROUPED TO NORTH VIETNAM WHERE HE STUDIED AT A UNIVERSITY. AFTER HIS GRADUATION IN 1960, DOCTOR TO MINH TRUNG WAS APPOINTED TO TEACH HISTORY AT A NUMBER OF UNIVERSITIES OF COMBINED STUDIES, PEDAGOGY AND POLITICS IN HANOI. HE WAS ALSO A RESEARCH SPECIALIST AT THE INSTITUTE OF HISTORY WHICH IS DIRECTED BY NORTH VIETNAM'S COMMITTEE OF SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY. IN A RESPONSE TO A REQUEST MADE BY MR. TRAN BACH DANG IN NOVEMBER 1974 (SIC) TRUNG WAS PERMITTED TO RETURN FROM REGROUPMENT AND WORK WITH TRAN BACH DANG, IN NOVEMBER 1973
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TRUNG QUIT THE (COMMUNIST) RANKS AND SOUGHT FREEDOM BY COMING OVER TO OUR SIDE.

12. DURING HIS STAY WITH TRAN BACH DANG, TRUNG WAS THE MAN ENTRUSTED WITH DOING RESEARCH ON POLITICAL PARTIES AND STUDENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE CONTRIBUTED GREATLY THROUGH HIS WRITINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS TO LEADING THE MANIPULATION OF THE PRESS IN SAIGON. AND NOW LET ME PRESENT MR. TO MINH TRUNG.

13. AS YOU HEARD IN THE INTRODUCTION, I AM A PERSON WHO CHOSE FREEDOM AFTER LIVING IN THE COMMUNIST RANKS FOR MANY YEARS. I WAS COSVN RESEARCH CADRE CONCERNED WITH POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE CITY. I WORKED DIRECTLY WITH MR. TRAN BACH DANG, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SAIGON/GIA DINH AREA. I ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS AND HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MEN WHO PROSELYTED THE SAIGON NEWSMEN. I COMMANDED THE FIFTH COLUMN IN CHARGE OF PROSELYTIZING THE SAIGON PRESS AND MET DIRECTLY WITH SAIGON REPORTERS IN A SECRET ZONE.

14. TODAY I WANT TO SUMMARIZE FOR YOU A BASIC DOCUMENT CONCERNING

THE COMMUNIST PLOT OF TAKING ADVNTAGE OF THE SAIGON PRESS IN ORDER TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. FIRST, I WANT TO SHOW YOU HOW THE COMMUNISTS ASSESSED THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE SCHEME OF OVERTHROWING THE RVN GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF LE DUAN, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITBURO, AS WELL AS THE DIRECTIVES OF PHAM HUNG, ALIAS BY HONG, SECRETARY OF COSVN, AND TRAN BACH DANG, THE MAN WHO DIRECTLY SUPERVISED THE WORK, (THE COMMUNISTS) CONSIDERED ITS STRUGGLE ON THE SAIGON PRESS FRONT AS FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL ATTACK IN THE POLITICAL MOVEMENT TO OVERTHROW THE RVN GOVERNMENT.

15. BECAUSE THE NEWSPAPERS ARE DISTRIBUTED OPENLY AND BROADLY IN SAIGON, THE COMMUNISTS SOUGHT TO TURN A NUMBER OF THEM, AT LEAST SEVEN, INTO THE COMMUNISTS' ORGANS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN SAIGON. THROUGH THESE NEWSPAPERS THE COMMUNIST WOULD CARRY OUT THEIR PROPAGANDA PROGRAM AND INSTIGATE THE MASSES TO TAKE TO THE STREETS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS IN ORDER TO OVERTURN THE RVN GOVERNMENT.

16. NOW FOR PART TWO. THE COMMUNISTS MOVED TO GET INTO THE GOOD GRACES OF THE PRESS AND PROMPTED THE LATTER TO LAUNCH A POLITICAL

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PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO OVERTHROW THE RVN. THEY ADVOCATED EXPLOITING THE NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED IN SAIGON TO CARRY OUT THEIR SCHEME AIMED AT TOPPLING THE RVN. THE COMMUNISTS ADVOCATED WRITING ITEMS TO BE PUBLISHED BY AUTHORIZED NEWSPAPERS IN SAIGON WITH A VIEW TO GUIDING THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS A POLITICAL LINE DESIGNED TO OVERTHROW THE RVN. THEY ALSO ADVOCATED SECURING THE COOPERATION OF SOME NEWSPAPERS IN DISSEMINATING ANTI-GOVERNMENT NEWS. NEWSPAPERS THAT ACTUALLY PUBLISHED ARTICLES THAT WERE APPROVED BY THE COMMUNISTS WERE WIDELY DISSEMINATED BY THEM AMONG THE MASSES, ESPECIALLY THE LABOR FORCE.

17. THE RADIO STATIONS OF HANOI AND THE NLF WERE ALSO USED TO BROADCAST OPEN AND MISLEADING DECLARATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESS MOVEMENT'S EFFORT TO FIGHT THE GOVERNMENT BY ACCUSING THE RVN GOVERNMENT OF MAKING ARRESTS AND CONFISCATING NEWSPAPERS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE HANOI AND NLF BROADCASTS WERE USED BY THE UNDERGROUND CADRES TO SUPPORT THE PRESS MOVEMENT THROUGH MEETINGS, DEMONSTRATIONS AND PETITIONS. IT IS WORTH NOTHING THAT IN THIS ACTIVITY OF COSVN, THE UNDERGROUND COMMUNISTS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO ENGAGE DIRECTLY IN THE FIGHT. THE MEANS THAT THEY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO SHOW UP AT THE MEETINGS BUT REMAIN BEHIND TO FURNISH FALSE DOCUMENTS AND MONEY ENABLING THOSE NEWSMEN WITH WHOM A CONNECTION HAD BEEN MADE TO TAKE ACTION IN ORDER TO PRODUCE CHAOS AMONG THE PRESS. THIS ACTIVITY WOULD PRODUCE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE RVN GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION AT HOME AND ABROAD. THAT IS WHAT THE COMMUNIST ADVOCATE.

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18. AS FOR PLANS, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE FORMED AN EDITORIAL STAFF THAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SURVEYING THE PRESS SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ON THE BASIS OF THIS SURVEY A CLASSIFICATION SYTEM WAS USED TO ASSIST IN THE TASK OF UNDERMINING THE PRESS. NEWSPAPERS WERE CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE BELIEVED TO BE INFLUENTIAL AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE NEUTRAL. THROUGH THIS EFFORT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT PAPERS OFTEN CRITICIZED THE GVN AND THEN TO DEVISE AN EFFECTIVE LINE TO LEAD THE NEWSPAPERS INTO FOLLOWING THE POLICY OF THE COMMUNISTS.

19. THE FIFTH COLUMN AIMED AT INCREASING THE NUMBER OF CADRES OPERATING WITHIN THE RANKS OF SAIGON NEWSMEN THROUGH TWO PROCESSES: BY BRINGING IN A NUMBER OF CADRES WHO HAD BEEN TRAINED IN THE NORTH OR IN THE SECRET ZONE OR BY SENDING UNIVERSITY AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS TO THE SECRET ZONES FOR TRAINING. UPON THEIR RETURN THEY WERE ORDERED TO INFILTRATE INTO THE RANKS OF NESPAPER CORRESPONDENTS, EDITORS AND PUBLISHERS IN SAIGON. THEIR WERE THREE METHODS USED FOR MAKING CONTACT WITH A NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS. THE FIRST CONSISTED OF CREATING SYMPATHY AND INFLUENCE OR IN PROVIDING PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IN PRESS RELATED SUBJECTS. THE SECOND CONSISTED OF BUILDING UP AGENCIES AND INDUCING THE SYMAPATHIZERS TO JOIN THEM WITH A VIEW TO FINALLY TURNING THEM INTO LOYAL CADRES ASSIGNED TO COMMAND SOME AREA AND OR CONTROL SOME NEWSPAPER OR OTHER AREA OF ACTIVITY. FOR EXAMPLE, A SELECTED REPORTER WOULD BE ASSIGNED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF

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FOLLOWING THE ACTIVITIES OF WORKERS OR UNIVERSITY AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND BY DELVING INTO THE DETAILS ENDEAVOR TO MOVE FROM ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT TO CALLING FOR ITS OVERTHROW. IN ADDITION TO THESE PRACTICAL PLANS THERE ARE TWO SUBSEQUENT PLANS, E.G. LEADING ACTIONS AND LEADING SLOGANS. AS FOR LEADING ACTIONS, DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING JANUARY 27, 1973, I ATTENDED A MEETING IN WHICH TRAN BACH DANG HIMSELF, AS SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF SAIGON AND GIA DINH, AND MUOI CUC, AS UNDER-SECRETARY OF COSVN, ISSUED THE FOLLOWING DIRECTIVE: IN LEADING ACTIONS FOR THE PRESS, EXTREMISM SHOULD NOT APPLY BUT EFFORTS SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON SLOGANS SUCH AS DEMANDING FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ABROGATION OF LAW 007, ORGANIZATION OF UNIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS AND ON THE JOB IMMUNITIES OF NESMEN. THE COMMUNISTS SAID THAT ONCE SUCH DEMANDS WERE MET, POLITICAL GAPS WOULD BE PRODUCED IN THE GVN'S POSITION THAT WOULD CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROSELYTIZING CADRE TO CARRY ON THEIR WORK IN RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL GROUPS AS WELL AS IN STUDENT AND INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES. THIS EFFORT WOULD AIM AT PUSHING AHEAD WITH THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY UNTIL FINALLY THE GVN IS ISOLATED. IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMUNIST OBJECTIVE IS TO ISOLATE PRESIDENT THEIU.

20. THE FIRST MOVE MADE BY THE COMMUNISTS CONSISTED OF ORDERING THE NEWSPAPERS UNDER THEIR CONTROL TO SEEK EVERY MEANS TO DEMAND THAT THE US GOVERNMENT END ITS AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNISTS, THE WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS WAS A SUCCESS SCORED BY THEM. IF NOW THE UNITED STATES CANCELS BOTH ITS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM, THEY (THE COMMUNISTS) WILL SURELY SUCCEED IN THEIR SCHEME TO SUBJUGATE SOUTH VIETNAM. FOR THIS REASON, IF ALL THESE BASIC DEMANDS ARE SATISFIED, THE COMMUNISTS' SUCCESS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY GUARANTEED.

21. THE SECOND SLOGAN WAS TO ACCUSE THE RVN GOVERNMENT OF VIOLATING THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON A CONTINUING BASIS AND DEMAND THAT THEY SERIOUSLY IMPLEMENT THE PARIS AGREEMENT. "IMPLEMENTATION" HERE MEANT RECONCILIATION AND CONCORD AS A STEP TOWARD SETTING UP A COEXISTENCE WITH THE NLF. THIS WAS THE BASIC DEMAND CONSTANTLY STRESSED IN NORTH VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA. THE THIRD SLOGAN REQUIRED THE PRESENT RVN GOVERNMENT TO RESIGN. IN THE EVENT IT DID NOT RESIGN EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO MANEUVER POLITICALLY TO OVERTHROW IT BEFORE THE GENERAL ELECTIONS COULD

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BE HELD. THE MOST DECISIVE PHASE OF THE STRUGGLE IN WHICH THE PRESS WOULD BE IN THE VANGUARD WOULD BE THE PHASE WHICH

FOLLOWED THE AND OF THE YEAR 1974 AND WILL TERMINATE PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1975.

22. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THOSE ARE THE BASIC DOCUMENTS WHICH WE HELPED DRAFT AND WHICH WE EXCHANGED WITH A NUMBER OF NEWSMEN WHO CAME FROM THE CITY TO THE SECRET ZONES AND WHICH I DIRECTLY EXCHANGED WITH THAM NHO, HEAD OF THE PRESS COMMITTEE AND TO HOAID WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THE FIFTH COLUMN IN SAIGON. MY PURPOSE IN EXPOSING THE CONTENTS OF THESE DOCUMENTS IS TO ENABLE YOU TO CLEARLY SEE AND UNDERSTAND THE GOVERNMENT POLICY DURING THIS PHASE. AS FOR THE UNDERGROUND CADRES, THEY HAD TO FIND OUT HOW TO MANIPULATE THE PRESS. THE COMMUNISTS CONSISTENTLY THOUGHT OF THE PRESS IN SAIGON AS A VERY IMPORTANT FRONT BUT THAT DID NOT MEAN THAT THEY HELD EVERY NEWSMAN IN HIGH REGARE. TO THEM ONLY THE COOPERATIVE NEWSMEN WERE IMPORTANT AND THEY WOULD PURGE THE REST WHEN THEY CAME TO POWER IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

23. SECOND WITNESS: I AM VU TRONG LUONG, 25 YEARS OF AGE AND MY PEN NAME IS NAM THAI SON. I WAS EDITOR OF DIEN TIN WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOMESTIC NEWS AND PAGES 3 AND 7. IN 1971, A CADRE WHOSE NAME WAS BA THEP AND WHO WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF MINE ASKED ME TO COOPERATE WITH HIS ORGANIZATION. AFTER SEVERAL CONTACTS, I AGREED TO WRK WITH HIS ORGANIZATION. SEEING THAT I WAS SKILLED IN WRTING, BA THEP SUGGESTED THAT I ATTEMPT TO INFILTRATE THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE DIEN TIN DAILY. IN APRIL 1974, I APPLIED FOR A JOB WITH DIEN TIN. LATER BE THEP GAVE ME INSTRUCTIONS WITH THREE OBJECTIVES: THE FIRST WAS TO EXPLOIT AND EXAGGERATE EXONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELFARE NEWS THAT WAS DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE RVN GOVERNMENT. THE SECOND WAS TO CREATE A TRAGIC

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PICTURE OF THE DECLINE IN THE ECONOMY AND FIX THE BLAME FOR THIS UPON THE RVN GOVERNMENT. THUS THE PEOPLE WOULD LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE RVN GOVERNMENT AND FAVOR A POLITICAL CHANGE. THE THIRD TASK ENTRUSTED TO ME WAS TO SEEK TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH AND PROPAGANDIZE A NUMBER OF NEWSMEN WHO WERE WORKING IN VARIOUS EDITORIAL OFFICES. I WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO PAY SPECIAL

ATTENTION TO THE MEN WHO HELD IMPORTANT POSTS ON THE EDITORIAL STAFFS SUCH AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL, SECRETARY OF THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OR THE MEN WHO WERE IN CHARGE OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN NEWS.

24. (IN THIS CAPACITY) I EXAGGERATED THE NEWS RELATED TO CASES OF SUICIDE. FOR EXAMPLE, MISS TRAN THI MINH, CYCLO DRIVER VO VAN NAM, MRS. NGUYEN THI TUYET ON PHAT DIEM STREET AND SOLDIER NGUYEN VAN THAN ALL COMMITTED SUICIDE FOR MANY DIFFERENT REASONS SUCH AS DISAPPOINTMENT IN LOVE, MENTAL PROBLEMS OR DEPRESSION RELATED TO DAILY PROBLEMS. I MADE UP THE STORY THAT ALL OF THEM WERE DRIVEN TO SUICIDE BY POVERTY AND HUNGER.

25. I SOUGHT TO DISTORT A FEW REPORTS RELATED TO THE STRUGGLE OF THE LABOR FORCE IN SAIGON IN ORDER TO CAUSE HATRED BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS, THUS CREATING PERMANENT CONFUSION AND SLOWING DOWN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE RVN.

26. ALLOW ME TO PRESENT SOME ITEMS RELATING TO THE SUBJECT I JUST UNCLASSIFIED

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MENTIONED. MY WORK INCLUDED ARTICLES ON THE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKERS AT NEWS PORT, THE WORKERS AT THE SAIGON PORT, THE PORTERS AT THE LE QUANG LIEM DOCK, THE WORKERS OF VINATEXCO TEXTILE COMPANY AND THE SAKYMEN BLANKET COMPANY.

27. ANOTHER ASPECT OF MY WORK WAS TO WRITE SHORT COMMENTARIES UNDER MY PEN NAME OF THAI SON WHICH I PUBLISHED IN THE PAGES I CONTROLLED. MY SUBJECTS WERE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS AND I EXPLOITED THOSE POINTS WHICH WERE UNFAVORABLE TO THE RVN GOVERNMENT. MY ARTICLES ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO CERTAIN INSIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND HELD THE GVN RESPONSIBLE FOR AROUSING PUBLIC INDIGNATION AND PROVOKING HATRED BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION TO BEING A STAFF MEMBER MYSELF, I ALSO ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH A NUMBER OF NEWSMEN AND INTENDED TO FOCUS MORE IN THE FUTURE ON THOSE NEWSMEN WHO HELD IMPORTANT POSITIONS SUCH AS SECRETARY GENERAL OR SECRETARY OF OTHER DAILIES. ONCE SUCH CONTACTS WERE ESTABLISHED OUR ACTIVITIES WOULD HAVE BECOME MORE EFFECTIVE IN MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO BA THEP'S EXPLANATION, IF WE SUCCEEDED

IN ESTABLISHING SUCH CONTACT WITH THE IMPORTANT STAFF MEMBERS OF THE DAILIES, WE WOULD BE ABLE TO CIRCULATE OUR NEWS, WHICH WAS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE COMMUNISTS, WITH RELATIVE EASE AND AT THE EXPENSE OF THE GVN.

28. I ALSO TRIED TO DOWNPLAY OR SIMPLY OMIT WHATEVER NEWS I BELIEVED WOULD REFLECT ADVERSELY ON THE NLF OR BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GVN. THIS INCLUDED NEWS SUCH AS THE RECENT ESTABLISHMENT OF AN NLF PERMANENT OFFICE NEXT TO THE U.N. AT GENEVA; DEMANDS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT BY SEVERAL POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS IN SVN OR THE DECISION OF THE U.S. CONGRESS TO CUMILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO THE RVN IN HALF. OUR IMPORTANT CADRES SUCH AS SECRETARY GENERAL OR SECRETARY ON THE EDITORIAL STAFF WOULD PUT SUCH NEWS ON THE FRONT PAGE WITH BIG HEADLINES WHILE NEWS ABOUT THE COMMUNIST SHELLINGS OF POPULATED AREAS AT PHU LAM, EXPLODING A MINE UNDER A BUS AT GIAO DUC, OR THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE MEETING TO CONDEMN THE COMMUNIST OCCUPATION OF PHUOC LONG WOULD BE OMITTED OR REDUCED TO A MINIMUM IN ORDER TO ATTRACT THE LEAST AMOUNT OF ATTENTION FROM THE READERS.

29. BE THEP INFORMED ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT AT PRESENT OUR ORGANIZATION IN THE SAIGON/GIA DINH AREA HAS A NUMBER OF CADRES PLANTED

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IN OTHER PAPERS. SOME OF THEM HOLD POSITIONS MORE IMPORTANT THAN MINE ON THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF DIEN TIN. HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE WERE OTHER ORGANIZATIONS BESIDES HIS OWN WHICH WERE CARRYING OUT SIMILAR ACTIVITIES AMONG THE PRESS. BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, THESE ORGANIZATIONS MUST FIND EVERY WAY TO STRUGGLE MORE ACTIVELY TO MEET THE CURRENT URGENT NEEDS.
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Message Attributes

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Draft Date: 08 FEB 1975
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